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TEMPORARY PROTECTION: TOWARDS A NEW
REGIONAL AND DOMESTIC FRAMEWORK
SUSAN MARTIN, ANDY SCHOENHOLTZ, AND
DEBORAH WALLER MEYERS*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past thirty-five years, the United States has seen the direct
influx of thousands of individuals leaving politically unstable countries.
While some seeking entry have proved themselves to be refugees and
obtained permanent protection in the United States, far more, including a
large number of people fleeing civil war, natural disasters, or comparable
forms of upheaval in their home countries, have failed to demonstrate that
they would be targets of persecution. Yet, their return to their home countries
has been complicated by the very circumstances that led to their flight:
conflict, violence, and repression. Over time, the United States developed a
series of ad hoc responses that protected such individuals, culminating in the
Immigration Act of 1990 ("IMMACT"), which provided legislative author-
ity for Temporary Protected Status ("TPS"). Nevertheless, after eight years,
many problems remain in the application of the law. Solving these problems
will contribute both to better immigration control and more humane re-
sponses to future crises.
Current policies fail on two accounts. First, the temporary protection
provision in the law generally has failed to protect the vast majority of those
in danger as a crisis develops and unfolds. If the United States government
protects significant numbers at all, protection is provided outside the confines
of the United States. Even so, the mechanisms for responding extraterritori-
ally are not well developed.2 Second, current policies regarding protection in
the United States do not provide the control mechanisms to ensure that
protection is not abused and that return, when appropriate, is effected.
The choice to admit people for temporary protection has been a difficult
one for the United States for two main reasons: the lack of control over entry;
* The authors are, respectively, Director and Director of Law and Policy Studies of the Georgetown
University Institute for the Study of International Migration, and Associate, International Migration Policy
Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Earlier versions of this paper were prepared for
consultations hosted by the United States Commission on Immigration Reform.
1. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978.
2. The absence of an effective regional protection system and the advantages of developing one are
spelled out in U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, U.S. REFUGEE POLICY: TAKING LEADERSHIP,
20-25 (1997), and FORCED MIGRATION PROJECTS, OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE, A PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A
TEMPORARY REFUGE SCHEME IN THE CARIBBEAN REGION FOR REFUGEE AND MIGRATION EMERGENCIES
(1995).
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and the inability to implement a fair but firm end game. These constraints
together with the fear of litigation challenging domestic protection regimes
have led policymakers to keep protection seekers offshore, such as on
Guantanamo, or to return them directly to countries they fled without
providing an opportunity for them to present requests for protection. But not
having a fully developed regional or domestic capability for addressing these
complex movements comes at a considerable cost. Estimates for the agency
costs of handling the 1994 Cuban exodus through the use of offshore safe
havens were more than $500 million.3 Further, an immigration system that
cannot fairly and efficiently process protection seekers lacks credibility for
which it pays a significant public cost.
The humanitarian argument for an improved temporary protection regime
emphasizes three points. First, the United States has a strong humanitarian
tradition of helping others in need. In matters of forced migration, this has resulted
in significant assistance and resettlement programs, as well as a reluctance to send
people back to dangerous conditions. Moreover, the images of civil war seen on
television by the American public make it politically difficult to forcibly repatriate
protection seekers regardless of their eligibility for asylum. For example, a
grassroots sanctuary movement stimulated Congressional interest in Salva-
dorans, leading to statutory safe haven for this population.4
Second, United States foreign policy interests have been, and can be, well
served by providing some form of temporary protection. This was true with
respect to Haiti as well as El Salvador and Nicaragua.5 The United States
continues to show international leadership on issues of temporary protection
where, for example, the populations being protected are in Europe, Asia, or
Africa. The Bosnian experience is only the most recent one where the United
States has urged our European friends to be generous. To underline that
policy, the United States has resettled Bosnians afforded temporary protec-
tion in Croatia, Germany, and elsewhere and has made the Bosnian resettle-
ment a centerpiece of the refugee admissions program.
6
Third, scholars assert that the United States has an obligation under.
international law not to return protection seekers to dangerous conditions.
3. This information came from high ranking officials responsible for the offshore safe havens who were
interviewed by the authors. A complete list of persons interviewed on temporary protection is appended.
Since interviews were conducted on the basis of anonymity, the text does not attribute statements to
specific person(s).
4. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101--649, § 303, 104 Stat. 4978, 5036.
5. In the case of Haiti, for example, the safe haven policy recognized the significance of the human
rights abuses of the Haitian military regime and the efforts of that regime to stifle the fledgling democracy.
Protection was provided until the United States restored the democratically-elected President of Haiti to
that office through military intervention.
6. See DEPARTMENTS OF STATE, JUSTICE, AND HHS, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON PROPOSED REFUGEE
ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995; DEPARTMENTS OF STATE, JUSTICE, AND HHS, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
ON PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996; DEPARTMENTS OF STATE, JUSTICE, AND HHS,
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997; and DEPARTMENTS
OF STATE, JUSTICE, AND HHS, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL
YEAR 1998 (showing the United State's build up of the Bosnian resettlement program).
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Professors Perluss and Fitzpatrick argue that there is a customary humanitar-
ian norm of international law that prohibits states from forcibly returning
aliens to countries in which their lives are threatened by armed conflict.7
Other scholars have argued that the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 8 provides a right not to be
returned to a country in which armed conflict would threaten one's life.9
Further, the United Nations Convention on Torture obligates signatories,
such as the United States, to protect individuals who would be in danger of
being subjected to torture if returned to the country they fled.'o
Immigration control also argues for a more effective and consistent
temporary protection regime. As described below, the United States has
resorted to a series of ad hoc policies over a long period of time to avoid
returning individuals to war-torn countries. Each time one of these extraordi-
nary statuses is invoked, the credibility of our immigration policy suffers.
This is particularly true when people in similar circumstances are treated
differently in the determination of whether or not to use administrative
discretion in providing protection. The generous responses to Cubans and
Nicaraguans, occurring at the same time most Haitians and Salvadorans were
denied a formal temporary protection status, exposed the lack of fairness in
United States immigration policy.'
The absence of an effective temporary protection policy also undermines
the United States asylum system. Many individuals who apply for asylum
fail to meet the criteria for refugee status (well-founded fear of persecution),
but they come from war-torn countries in which they face real dangers,
including a well-founded fear of death. 12 Though they may be denied asylum
ultimately, their applications are far from abusive as they often come from
societies that produce significant numbers of refugees. The average victim of
a civil conflict has too little knowledge of international law to distinguish
between persecution and other forms of endangerment. Further, the indi-
7. See Deborah Perluss & Joan F. Hartman (now Fitzpatrick), Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a
Customary Norm, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 551, 554 (1985). The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") has
rejected such arguments in Matter of Medina, 19 1. & N. Dec. 734 (BIA 1988). Other commentators argue
that the United States' obligation not to return applies only to refugees recognized under the U.N.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. See Kay Hailbronner, Non-Refoulement and Humanitarian
Refugees: Customary Law or Wishful Legal Thinking?, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 857 (1986).
8. Geneva Convention No. IV, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
9. T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY, 1161 n.35 (4th ed. 1998).
10. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
reprinted in Human Rights, A Compilation of International Instruments, U.N. Doe. STIHRII[Rev.3
(1988), at 212-26.
11. See, e.g., ALEINIKOFF Er AL., supra note 9, at 1162-67 (describing the differential treatment of
Salvadorans as compared to Nicaraguans in the 1980's, and the Haitians as compared to the Cubans prior
to 1994, where the former were generally interdicted by the Coast Guard and returned to Haiti, while
Cubans were "warmly greeted and put on a fast-track toward permanent residency"); NORMAN ZUCKER &
NAIOMI ZUCKER, DESPERATE CROSSINGS: SEEKING REFUGE IN AMERICA, 45-46 (1996) (discussing the
foreign policy and domestic constituency factors that influenced the differential treatment of Cubans and
Haitians).
12. See Dennis Gallagher et al., Temporary Safe Haven: The Need for North American-European
Responses, in REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 333 (Loescher & Monahan eds., 1989).
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vidual adjudicating the claim is often reluctant to deny asylum knowing the
potential danger faced by the applicant if returned prematurely to a conflict
situation. Unless the protection seeker comes from one of a few TPS-
designated countries, however, there is little alternative: approve the applica-
tion by stretching the refugee definition; or maintain the integrity of the
asylum system by denying it and risk sending the applicant back to danger-
ous circumstances.
Too often, a third approach has been to effectively ignore the presence of
these individuals so a decision is not needed. As a result, large numbers of
individuals have been permitted to remain in the United States without legal
status. Because they do not qualify for any legal status, no record is kept of
who they are or where they live. Even if circumstances change in the home
country and return becomes possible, finding these "tolerated" individuals is
very difficult.1
3
The arguments against temporary protection stem largely from the diffi-
culty of implementing policies that will not result in widespread abuse of
immigration laws. There are two principal flaws in temporary protection
regimes: temporary protection can become a magnet attracting individuals
who might not otherwise have left their home countries and/or sought entry
into the United States; and return of those granted temporary protection, not
only in the United States but in other industrialized countries as well, has
proved elusive. To the extent that temporary protection regimes become a
backdoor to permanent immigration, policymakers will remain reluctant to
invoke the status.
From a different perspective, even supporters of temporary protection for
civil war victims worry that it will undermine the ability of refugees to seek
asylum and thus the principle of first asylum. 14 This concern is prompted by a
major tension in international law surrounding asylum issues. Individuals
have a right to seek asylum, but the decision to grant them asylum is a
decision made by the sovereign nation. The goal of deterring the entrance of
large numbers of people may have the effect of deterring exit from the home
country. Individuals whose only choice is indefinite detention in camps may
well decide to remain in a dangerous circumstance within their own country,
sometimes becoming internally displaced. The capacity to provide protection
to those who remain at home is, at best, limited.
Nevertheless, providing temporary protection-but not permanent admis-
sion-has long been common in the international arena. The United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR"), for example, believes that
the first priority is to protect deserving individuals in the region until
13. DENNIS GALLAGHER ET AL., REFUGEE POLICY GROUP, SAFE HAVEN: POLICY RESPONSES TO REFUGEE-
LIKE SITUATIONS 5 (1987).
14. See generally, Joan Fitzpatrick, Flight from Asylum: Trends toward Temporary "Refuge"and Local
Responses to Forced Migrations, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 13 (1994).
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conditions change sufficiently to allow voluntary repatriation.1 5 The next
choice would be protection or resettlement in a nearby country, where there is
less of a culture and climate change and voluntary return remains a possibil-
ity. Resettlement in a more distant third country is generally utilized only
when other options are not possible.
This article reviews current temporary protection policies, particularly in
the context of the responses to mass migration from Central America and the
Caribbean, and then sets out a proposal for a regional and domestic protec-
tion regime that better balances the dual obligations of immigration control
and humanitarian commitments.
II. CURRENT TEMPORARY PROTECTION POLICIES
The number of statuses afforded to people who reach the United States in
need of protection is almost as complicated as their reasons for flight. The
Refugee Act of 1980 is the principal legislative framework for admitting
individuals who meet the refugee definition-that is, those who have a
well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of political opinion, race,
religion, nationality or membership in a social group.1 6 Those granted
admission as a refugee or asylee (depending on whether they are outside or
inside of the country) may adjust to permanent residence after one year.
Short- and long-term parole or special entrant statuses have been used to
permit people to enter the country prior to a full determination as to whether
they will be permitted to remain. 17 Parole has also been used to admit
individuals who do not meet the refugee definition but have some other
humanitarian reason to be admitted.
Some of those whose asylum claims are rejected have been given another
form of discretionary relief from deportation under either special legislative
authority or administrative discretion. Individuals already in this country may be
granted Temporary Protected Status ("TPS") if the Attorney General has deter-
mined that they should not be required to depart because of a civil conflict, natural
disaster, or comparable extraordinary conditions in their country of origin. 8
A. Temporary Protected Status
TPS was created to provide a legislative remedy for individuals fleeing
civil conflicts.1 9 TPS is invoked by the Attorney General when the Adminis-
15. See UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES: THE CHALLENGE OF PROTECTION 169-75
(1993) [hereinafter Tim STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES] (explaining UNHCR's mandate and policies).
16. See generally Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
17. See Arthur C. Helton, Immigration Parole Power. Toward Flexible Responses to Migration
Emergencies, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1637 (Dec. 12, 1994) (discussing the scope and purpose of parole
power).
18. See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 207, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (as amended by Refugee
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(b), 94 Stat. 102).
19. TPS was enacted following a legislative effort to require the Executive branch to grant Extended
Voluntary Departure ("EVD") to Salvadorans who fled the civil conflict in that country. EVD was used
1998]
GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL
tration believes that conditions in a country meet the following IMMACT
criteria:
1) There is an on-going armed conflict, and requiring return would
pose a serious threat to personal safety;
2) There has been an earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, or other
environmental disaster resulting in a substantial, but temporary,
disruption of living conditions; the foreign state is unable, tempo-
rarily, to handle adequately the return of its nationals; and the
foreign state officially has requested temporary protection for its
nationals in the United States; or
3) There exist extraordinary and temporary conditions that prevent
nationals from returning in safety, unless the Attorney General finds
that permitting the aliens to remain temporarily is contrary to the
national interest.
20
The decision to provide TPS is a purely discretionary one, but once
invoked it applies to all residents of that country (or a region of that country
that is so designated) who arrived in the United States before a cut-off date
specified by the Attorney General. 21 There is no judicial review of the
decision to invoke TPS. Those granted TPS are permitted to work during the
period the status is in effect.22 Aliens with TPS are not considered to be
permanently residing in the United States under color of law, and they may
between 1960 and 1990 as a form of ad hoc protection invoked at the discretion of the Attorney General. It
was essentially an exercise of prosecutorial discretion where the Attorney General elected, usually on the
advice of the Department of State, to grant blanket EVD to nationals of a certain country. This action
meant that INS would take no action to force departure for as long as the policy remained in effect. A 1982
INS staff study located sixteen occasions since 1960 in which EVD had been granted to aliens because of
upheaval in the home country.
EVD has been granted to the following nationalities over the last twenty years: Ethiopians (1977-82,
then on case-by-case basis); Ugandans (1978-86); Iranians (1979); Nicaraguans (1979-80); Afghans
(1980-85, then on case-by-case basis); and Poles (1982-89). The Lebanese received two periods of EVD
after TPS was terminated in April 1993.
In 1987, Congress enacted a special provision allowing certain EVD beneficiaries a twenty-one-month
period in which to apply for temporary resident status and eventually for permanent resident status. This
applied only to nationals of Poland, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Uganda. As originally introduced by
Senator Helms, this legislation was meant to benefit only Poles; it was expanded during the course of
congressional consideration. About 5,500 people applied for these benefits; some 70% were from Poland.
See BILL FRELICK & BARBARA KOHNEN, U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, FILLING THE GAP: TEMPORARY
PRoTEcTED STATUS 11-12, 28 (Dec. 1994); ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 9, at 1158-66.
20. See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 244(b)(1), 66 Stat. 163, 216 (1952) (as amended by
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 4978, and Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546).
21. See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 244(c), 66 Stat. 163, 210 (1952) (as amended by
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5030, Miscellaneous and
Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-232, § 304(a),
307(l)(5), 105 Stat. 1733, 1749-53, Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-416, § 219(0), (z)(2),108 Stat. 4305, 4316, Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 308(b)(7), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-615).
22. See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 244(a)(2), 66 Stat. 163, 214 (1952) (as amended by
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5030, Illegal Immigration




be deemed ineligible for public assistance by states and localities. a3 While
under TPS, they cannot be detained based on their immigration status. a4 The
law includes strict procedures for allowing those protected to become
permanent residents through legislation.25
An annual report is supposed to be provided to Congress detailing which
countries have been designated for TPS, enumerating how many have been
granted TPS, and explaining why countries were designated or had their
designations terminated. 6 Apparently, the Executive branch generally has
been unable to provide accurate data, so the annual reports usually are not
issued.
To date, twelve countries have been designated for TPS by the Attorney
General. These countries and information concerning their designation are
listed in Table 1.
The current system provides a great deal of discretion to the Executive
Branch in determining whether and to whom TPS should be granted. The
designation of countries allows for group determinations and therefore
potentially provides a speedy way to provide protection, particularly when a
political crisis emerges in a home country.
TPS has been used to provide protection only to people already in the
United States when it is authorized by the Attorney General, through the
specification of a date by which applicants must have entered the United
States to qualify. It has not generally been used as a means of handling an
unfolding crisis abroad that forces people to flee. By limiting TPS to those
already in the country by that date, the program cannot act as a magnet.
However, the current application of TPS raises concerns since it permits the
deportation of individuals who entered after the cut-off date, even though
they would face substantially similar circumstances in the home country as
would be faced by those granted protection.
A rolling cut-off date would provide a needed mechanism to respond to the
humanitarian need of all aliens who would be endangered if returned to their
home country. For the first time since the statute became law, TPS was
re-designated in 1997 for a country in order to protect individuals who fled
23. See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 244(f), 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (as amended by
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5030, Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 308(b)(7), 110 Stat. 3009-546,
3009-615). See infra, note 107 and accompanying text.
24. See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 244(d)(4), 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (as amended by
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5030, Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 308(b)(7), 110 Stat. 3009-546,
3009-615).
25. See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 244(h), 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (as amended by
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5030, Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 308(b)(7), 110 Stat. 3009-546,
3009-615). Passage of such legislation requires a supermajority vote of three-fifths in the Senate.
26. See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 244(i), 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (as amended by
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5030, Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 308(b)(7), 110 Stat. 3009-546,
3009-615).
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TABLE 1-GRANTS OF TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS
'DATE OF DATE OF ESTIMATED
DESIGNATED TERMINATION OF NUMBER
COUNTRY STATUS STATUS (UNOFFICIAL)
EL SALVADOR 11/29/90 6/30/92A 187,128
KUWAIT 3/27/91 3/27/92B 343
LEBANON 3/27/91 4/9/93 9,214
LIBERIA 3/27/91 c 9/28/99 5,803
SOMALIA 9/16/91 9/17/99 347
BosNIA 8/10/92 8/10/99 400
RWANDA 6/7/94 12/6/97 200
MONTSERRAT 8/22/97 8/27/99 300
BURUNDI 11/4/97 11/3/99 -
SIERRA LEONE 11/4/97 11/3/99 -
SUDAN 11/4/97 11/3/99 -
Kosovo 6/9/98 6/8/99 -
a Following TPS, the Bush and Clinton Administrations granted Deferred En-
forced Departure [DED] to Salvadorans and reissued work authorization until June
30, 1993 and December 31, 1994, respectively.
b Following TPS, Kuwaiti residents were granted DED which extended to
December 31, 1993.
1 On April 17, 1997, Liberia became the first re-designated TPS country so that
the United States could extend protection to those who arrived on or before June 1,
1996, but missed the original designation's March 27, 1991 cut-off. In September
1998, Liberia was again re-designated, making TPS available to Liberians who
arrived on or before September 29, 1998.
Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service.
the civil war and arrived in the United States after the initial cut-off date.2 7
However, a rolling cut-off date that applied to all members of a nationality
could precipitate mass migration, particularly from countries geographically
close to the United States. Also at issue is whether those granted temporary
status would return when the crisis is over.
B. Deferred Enforced Departure
Deferred Enforced Departure ("DED") is an administrative stay of
deportation ordered by the President. 28 It was first used in response to the
27. See Extension of Designation and Redesignation of Liberia Under Temporary Protected Status
Program, 62 Fed. Reg. 16608 (1997).
28. See ALEINIKOFF Er AL., supra note 9, at 1164.
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Chinese government crackdown on the democracy movement in 1989, when
the Bush Administration suspended forced departures of Chinese nationals.29
Apparently, the administration inherited a concern of the Reagan Administra-
tion in connection with creating Extended Voluntary Departure ("EVD") for
nationals who had fled a left-wing regime (such as Nicaragua) that could be
applied as precedent to nationals fleeing a right-wing regime friendly to the
United States (such as El Salvador). 30 The Bush Administration avoided
EVD terminology both in its policy announcements and when it formalized
DED by Executive Order 12711 of April 11, 1990. The Chinese Student
Protection Act of 19923' eventually allowed most DED beneficiaries to
become lawful permanent residents.
In June 1992, President Bush directed INS to delay forced departure of
Salvadorans who had registered for TPS until June 30, 1993.32 President
Clinton granted a further extension until December 31, 1994. 3 3 This policy
covered a large number of Salvadorans (reliable data is unavailable), but
considerably less than the number granted TPS because many Salvadorans
thought the registry would be used to effect their deportation.34
In December 1994, after consulting with United States and Salvadoran
government officials, the INS determined that the political and human rights
situation inside El Salvador had improved significantly and could no longer
serve as a basis for the continuation of DED.3 5 Thus DED expired on
December 31, 1994.36 Recognizing that many Salvadorans would continue to
have other legal protections and to ensure a smooth transition for those
applying for other immigration benefits, the INS automatically extended the
validity of DED employment authorization documents for nine months.37
C. Nonenforcement of Deportation
Perhaps the most common form of protection has been the nonenforce-
ment of deportation rather than the grant of a specific temporary status. A
29. See id.; FRELICK & KOHNEN, supra note 19, at 12.
30. See ALELNIKOFF ET AL., supra note 9, at 1164.
31. See The Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-404, 106 Stat. 1969.
32. See Deferral of Enforced Departure for Salvadorans, 57 Fed. Reg. 28700 (1992).
33. See Extension of Deferral of Enforced Departure for Nationals of El Salvador, 58 Fed. Reg. 32157
(1993). With respect to the repatriation of Salvadorans, the government of El Salvador specifically
requested that the United States not deport massive numbers of their citizens as they feared a large influx
of citizens coupled with a substantial reduction in remittances would have a destabilizing impact on the
country. See FRELICK & KOHNEN, supra note 19, at 12.
34. See INS Announces Salvadoran DED Extension, 70 It~rrERPRETER RELEASES 707 (May 27, 1993).
35. See INS, DEFERRED ENFORCED DEPARTURE FOR SALvADORANs ExPIREs DECEMBER 31, 1994 (Dec. 2,
1994).
36. See Expiration of Deferred Enforced Departure for Nationals of El Salvador, 59 Fed. Reg. 62751
(1994).
37. See id. The INS anticipated (correctly) that many affected Salvadoran would receive extensions of
employment authorization based on asylum applications filed under the terms of a 1990 court settlement in
American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F.Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991). In that case, Salvadoran and
Guatemalan asylum seekers accused the Attorney General and the INS of using improper political
considerations to deny asylum to those who fled El Salvador and Guatemala. Under the settlement, about
190,000 Salvadorans were permitted to pursue their asylum applications.
1998]
GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL
lengthy asylum backlog, for example, was tolerated in part to avoid returning
people to a civil war (although bureaucratic delays must also be factored in).
The asylum backlog grew to over 400,000 cases in the 1990's, the vast
majority of the applicants came from three Central American countries: El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.38
With respect to one national group (Nicaraguans applying in the mid-
1980's), asylum approvals were officially recorded but denials often were
placed in storage and "forgotten." (This occurred in the Miami District.) In
other instances, District Directors simply have not acted on final orders of
deportation; the individuals issued final orders have been considered to be
very low priority and rarely have been apprehended or deported. For
example, even when the Reagan Administration was resisting granting EVD
to nationals of El Salvador, only 3,000 Salvadorans were deported each year
out of the tens of thousands who might have been.39
III. TEMPORARY PROTECTION AND MASS MIGRATION EMERGENCIES
Two back-to-back mass migrations toward United States territory during
the 1990s-one from Haiti and one from Cuba-illustrate many of the issues
arising from current temporary protection policies.
A. Haiti
In response to Haitian migrants taking to boats in the late 1970's and early
1980's, the United States entered into an agreement with Haiti in 1981
permitting the interdiction of illegal Haitian migrants and the return of all
except those determined to be refugees.4 0 According to Coast Guard statis-
tics, the Coast Guard interdicted approximately 22,000 Haitians from 1981-
1990.4 ' Following the 1990 election of a new President, Jean Bertrand
Aristide, with 67% of the popular vote, the number of Haitian migrants
remained relatively low in the first seven months of the Aristide presidency;
only 1,277 Haitians were interdicted by the Coast Guard.42 After the
September 30, 1991 overthrow of President Aristide in a military coup,
Haitian interdictions dramatically rose and totaled approximately 36,500
from November 1991 through May 1992. 43 Those interdicted were brought
to Guantanamo Naval Base. From there, some 33% were brought to the
38. See Tables Fand29, 1995 STAT. Y.B. OFTm INS, 77, 86-87.
39. See Table 64, 1990 STAT. Y.B. OF THE INS, 173.
40. See Agreement Between the United States of America and Haiti, Sept. 23, 1981, U.S.-Haiti, 33
U.S.T. 3559, T.I.A.S. No. 10241.





United States to pursue asylum claims. Those screened out were returned on
Coast Guard cutters to Port-au-Prince."
In response to the largest single monthly exodus that occurred in May
1992, when 13,053 Haitians were interdicted, President Bush issued Execu-
tive Order No. 12,807 (also known as the Kennebunkport Order) on May 24,
1992, instructing the Coast Guard to interdict Haitians and return them
directly to Haiti without any determination of refugee status.45
This policy toward Haitian migrants was an issue during the 1992
Presidential campaign. Then-candidate Clinton promised to end the policy of
direct return should he be elected.46 In January 1993, President-Elect Clinton
announced that the United States would temporarily continue the Kennebunk-
port Order and focus its efforts improving procedures to process claims
within Haiti and on restoring the democratically elected President Aristide.
Fearing mass migration into the United States, the new Administration was
unwilling to risk ending direct return.47
It was not until May 8, 1994 that President Clinton announced the end of
direct return of Haitian migrants interdicted at sea.48 Among the factors
contributing to this decision were increased domestic political pressures
(such as lobbying by the Congressional Black Caucus and human rights
advocates), increased reports of human rights violations in Haiti, and a
strengthened foreign policy against the defacto military government.49
According to officials interviewed by the authors,5° the President directed
those involved to find a way to stop direct returns and guarantee refuge,
without specifying the particular means of doing so. Senior government
officials considered two major options. One was, in effect, a return to the
pre-May 1992 policy of processing Haitian boat people to determine if they
met the criteria for being granted refugee status. Those who met the criteria
would be cleared for admission into the United States; those whose claims
were rejected would be returned to Haiti. The second option involved the
establishment of a safe haven for Haitians outside of the United States.
Should Haitians wish to avail themselves of the protection afforded by the
safe haven, they would be able to remain until conditions changed in Haiti. A
third option was not seriously considered-permitting Haitians into the
United States to press their cases for asylum or safe haven. The Administra-
tion recognized inadequacies in domestic laws, policies and resources that
44. See INS, Advocates Dispute Asylum Statistics, 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1066 (1992).
45. See Exec. Order No. 12807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23133 (1992).
46. See Thomas L. Friedman, Haitians Returned Under New Policy, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1992, at A 1.
47. See Ruth Marcus and Al Kamen, Aides Say Clinton Will Extend Policy on Returning Haitians,
WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1993, at A25.
48. See Gwen Ifill, President Names Black Democrat Advisor on Haiti, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1994, at Al.
49. See Roberto Suro, Dealing With Several Crises at Once: Clinton Tries to Address Haiti's Refugees,
Its Rulers, and Its Democracy. WASH. POST, May 10, 1994, at A3; Karen De Witt, Hunger Strike on Haiti:
Partial Victory at Least, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1994, at A7.
50. See supra note 3.
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precluded that option. With a backlog of over 400,000 asylum cases,5 ' the
potential for lengthy appeals, the high cost attributable to resettlement within
the United States, and the difficulty in returning individuals when conditions
permitted, entry into the United States appeared unworkable.
Some migration experts in the Administration argued that a safe haven
would best protect those in need and discourage those who were looking for
resettlement in the United States. Others, who thought that processing would
be a more effective response, were convinced that only a relatively small
number of Haitians would qualify for refugee status and that the quick return
of the rejected asylum-seekers would serve as a better deterrent than safe
haven to the flight of those with weak claims. Several officials pointed out
that the safe haven option appeared counterintuitive to those unfamiliar with
its use elsewhere in the world and who feared that safe haven would lead to
an uncontrollable exodus if every Haitian had the opportunity to come under
United States protection. After discussions with other high-level Administra-
tion officials, decision makers at the National Security Council reportedly
determined to carry out the President's directive by initiating refugee
processing outside the United States.
To lend credibility to the operation, the State Department entered into
negotiations with UNHCR on establishing a viable process for refugee status
determinations. While UNHCR participated in the refugee processing, it
favored temporary safe haven rather than refugee processing, because the
latter implied the return of those screened out. UNHCR felt, given the human
rights problems and generalized violence under the defacto government, that
no one should be returned to Haiti.
The United States, together with UNHCR, contacted governments in the
region to find locations for processing the Haitians. Attempts to regionalize
Haitian migration had been made during the Bush Administration, but a
number of officials stated that these efforts did not involve the highest level
of Administration officials. In contrast, the Clinton Administration's success
in enlisting the support of some Caribbean countries to provide processing
sites has been attributed to the direct intervention and genuine interest of
high-level Administration officials, including the President and Vice Presi-
dent.
Even with this level of involvement, regional cooperation was limited. The
Executive Branch first attempted to negotiate for a land-based processing
facility in the region but obtained only one shipboard processing site. Some
countries did indicate a willingness to provide limited safe haven facilities
for Haitian migrants and possibly even resettlement, but the number of places
offered were small or not immediately available.
Processing began on the USNS Comfort, a converted Navy hospital ship
docked in Kingston, Jamaica, on June 16, 1994. Of the 2,294 people
51. See Table 30, 1994 STAT. Y.B. OF THE INS, 85.
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interviewed by INS during the next three weeks, 596 (26%) were granted
refugee status. By early July, the outflow of migrants from Haiti sharply
increased to over 3,000 per day and quickly overwhelmed the processing
capacity of the United States Comfort. 2
On July 5, 1994, the decision was made to provide safe haven for Haitians
at the United States military base on Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.5 3 Guantanamo
could accommodate the greatest number of migrants and could be expanded
as necessary. It should be noted, however, that this view of Guantanamo's
expansion capacity was new. In 1992, the Executive Branch had claimed that
no more than 12,500 people could be housed on Guantanamo.
The Coast Guard brought some 20,000 Haitians to Guantanamo. 54 Not
long after the policy was changed from processing and resettlement to
temporary safe haven, the numbers of Haitian migrants rapidly decreased.
Whereas in July, more than 16,000 Haitians were interdicted, only about 300
were interdicted in August and even fewer thereafter.55
By the middle of July, voluntary repatriation of Haitians had begun. As a
United States military intervention and the subsequent return of President
Aristide appeared imminent, greater numbers of Haitians opted to return to
Haiti. On September 19, 1994, United States military forces entered Haiti.
One entire camp requested to be repatriated en masse upon President
Aristide's return. President Aristide was returned to power on October 15,
1994. Most of the Haitians on Guantanamo opted to repatriate voluntarily.
On December 29, 1994, the United States authorities told the remaining
Haitians (less than 5,000) that they should return to Haiti by January 5, 1995.
Only about 15% did so. Except for some 800 allowed to remain for
humanitarian or protection reasons, including 300 unaccompanied minors,
the rest were mandatorily returned to Haiti.56
B. Cuba
For thirty-five years, United States policy was that those who fled Cuba
and arrived on United States soil were paroled into the United States. All
Cubans paroled into the country were then eligible for adjustment to
permanent resident status after one year, according to the terms of the Cuban
Adjustment Act of 1966.57 Between 1961 and 1993, more than 600,000
Cubans entered the United States and became permanent residents.58
52. See U.S. COMMITrEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 1995, 180; U.S. DEPT. OF STATE,
BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES AND MIGRATION, DAILY INTERDICTION OF HAITIAN BOAT PEOPLE BY
U.S. COAST GUARD AND U.S. NAVY, 6/15/94-10/6/94 (1994) (attached at Table 3).
53. See id.
54. See COAST GUARD HAITIAN RESCUE STATISTICS, supra note 41.
55. See id.
56. See WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 1995, supra note 52, at 180.
57. Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966).
58. See Table 2, 1993 STATISTICAL Y.B. OF THE INS, 27-28.
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The largest single group of Cubans-approximately 130,000-came
through the Mariel boatlift in 1980.59 During the remainder of the decade of
the 1980's, smaller numbers continued to arrive by boat and raft. The number
of Cuban rafters increased over the next few years, and in 1991-1993 the
Coast Guard interdicted almost 8,500 Cuban refugees. 60 From April through
July 1994, the Coast Guard interdicted over 3,600 Cubans, as many as it had
in all of 1993. 6t
During the summer of 1994, civil unrest began occurring in Havana; in
August, Fidel Castro responded by allowing Cubans to leave without
62restriction. 2 The numbers of interdicted Cubans increased dramatically,
from 150 on August 13 to more than 500 August 17, with every indication
that the numbers would continue to mount.6 3 On August 18, the Administra-
tion held a "principals" meeting, where it was quickly decided that a major
policy reversal toward Cuban rafters was necessary. On August 19, 1994,
President Clinton announced that interdicted Cubans would be brought to a
safe haven on Guantanamo and those who reached the United States would
be detained.64
A number of factors contributed to this sudden change in policy, not the
least of which was the timing of the Haitian and Cuban migrations that led
many to compare the treatment of Haitians with the treatment of Cubans.
Also, a new precedent had been set with the creation of safe haven for
Haitians. Other factors which allowed the implementation of a once unthink-
able policy included a shift in the views of the Cuban American community,
concerted INS action to avoid another "freedom flotilla," and the re-election
campaign of Florida Governor Lawton Chiles.
65
For many years, the Cuban-American community, particularly in Miami,
had welcomed the illegal flow of Cubans, viewing it as an embarrassment to
the Castro regime and as proof of the regime's problems.66 After public signs
of unrest in Cuba and the departure of greater numbers of rafters, however,
some in the Cuban-American community felt that they did not want to
continue to provide Castro with a safety valve, preferring mounting dissent
within Havana.67 Some also felt that those Cubans who were leaving did not
oppose Communism as strongly as they themselves did, but simply were
leaving for economic reasons. 68 Further, some in the Cuban-American
59. See ZUCKER & ZUCKER, supra note 11, at 5.
60. See U.S. COAST GUARD, COAST GUARD CUBAN RESCUE STATISTICS (Nov. 10, 1994) (attached at
Table 4).
61. See id.
62. See ZUCKER & ZUCKER, supra note 11, at 120-21.
63. See U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, BUREAU OF POPULATION REFUGEES AND MIGRATION, DAILY INTERDIC-
TIONS OF CUBAN MIGRANTS BY U.S. COAST GUARD AND U.S. NAVY, 7/15/94-10/6/94 (1994) (attached at
Table 5).
64. See ZUCKER & ZUCKER, supra note 11, at 125-26.
65. See id. at 124-26.
66. See id. at 120.
67. See id. at 124-25.
68. See supra note 3.
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community were concerned about the ability of southern Florida to absorb
another influx of migrants as it had during the Mariel boat lift.
69
The INS immediately initiated harbor patrol in the Miami area, sent a
strong warning message to those who might use their boats to bring Cuban
rafters to the United States, and seized boats headed toward Cuba to pick up
rafters. The United States Attorney in Miami then prosecuted individuals
who disregarded the warning.
Governor Chiles was determined not to have a repetition of Mariel,
particularly when he was trying to win re-election in a tight race.7' Prior to
the Administration's change in policy, he announced that all Cubans landing
in Florida would be detained rather than processed and released. Thus, the
Administration was faced with the prospect of a governor declaring a
statewide immigration emergency and taking state action to resolve the
situation, not a desired precedent given the number of other states grappling
with migration problems. President Clinton and United States Attorney
General Janet Reno, formerly State Attorney for Dade County, were also
sensitive to concerns about a repeat of Mariel. Many political observers felt
that the Mariel Cuban riots in Fort Chaffee, Arkansas contributed to then-
Governor Clinton's re-election defeat.7 2
While the safe haven policy significantly decreased the number of Haitians
who sought protection outside of Haiti, the number of Cuban rafters inter-
dicted after the announced policy change continued to increase until the
weather created rough conditions toward the end of August. 73 The number of
rafters picked up again significantly when the weather permitted new boat
departures, but began to decline in early September.7 4 The flow stopped
almost completely when the United States and Cuba entered into a migration
agreement that included Castro reimposing constraints on departures and the
United States promising to increase legal immigration channels for Cubans.7 5
Some 32,000 Cuban migrants were interdicted by the Coast Guard, in
August and September 1994 and brought to the Guantanamo safe haven.7 6
Thanks to the foundation laid during the Haitian crisis with respect to
regional sites, about 9,000 of these Cubans were transferred to a United
States military-run safe haven near Panama City.77 As part of the United
States--Cuban Migration Agreement, Cuba agreed in principle to accept
those Cubans who requested voluntary return.7 8
69. See ZUCKER AND ZUCKER, supra note 11, at 125.
70. See supra note 3.
71. See ZUCKER AND ZUCKER, supra note 11, at 124.
72. See supra note 3.
73. See DAILY INTERDICTIONS OF CUBAN MIGRANTS, supra note 63.
74. See id.
75. See ZUCKER AND ZUCKER, supra note 11, at 126-27.
76. See id. at 126.
77. See U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 1996, 187.
78. See ZUCKER & ZUCKER, supra note 11, at 126-27.
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On May 2, 1995, the Clinton Administration announced that most of the
Cubans would be paroled to the United States, but that all rafters henceforth
would be interdicted, provided an abbreviated shipboard screening proce-
dure, and repatriated to Cuba unless they met the screening criteria.79 The
United States encouraged those seeking refuge to apply for recognition at the
United States Interests Section in Havana.80 In the end, most of the Cubans
(28,450) on Guantanamo or in Panama were paroled into the United States.
Only a few Cubans found a permanent home in other countries. Some 600
returned voluntarily through official channels, while about 1,000 Cubans
jumped the fence at Guantanamo to return spontaneously to government-
controlled Cuba. About 350 found ineligible for parole to the United States
were returned involuntarily. Following the new policy announcement in
May, interdictions at sea declined considerably.
81
The Haitian and Cuban experiences taught a number of valuable lessons.
The United States can provide protection to those fleeing conflicts, civil
disturbances, human rights abuses, and repression even in the midst of a mass
migration emergency with minimal risk of inflaming further mass move-
ments. Moreover, the United States can engage regional neighbors in
providing such protection. However, the time for such engagement is not
during the height of the emergency. The United States should not wait for the
next crisis. Rather, the federal government should negotiate the terms of
regional cooperation now, when movements within the region are relatively
quiet. And, as part of these negotiations, we should rethink our own
temporary protection policies to improve our domestic responses to the
presence of those seeking safe haven within United States territory.
IV. TOWARDS A NEW TEMPORARY PROTECTION REGIME
An effective temporary protection regime must meet a number of criteria.
Above all else, it must ensure protection, that is, that migrants will not be
returned to places where they face potential loss of life or liberty. The regime
must work for the, individual protection seeker as well as for those fleeing en
masse during a migration emergency. In our view, temporary protection
complements and supports asylum, which protects those fearing persecution,
and, as such, it should not be seen as a substitute for a fair and effective
asylum system.
Temporary protection should also not be seen as an avenue towards
long-term admission. An effective capacity to repatriate those granted tempo-
rary protection when conditions permit would greatly enhance the willing-
ness of nations to provide safe haven when needed. However, a fixation on
the expected temporariness of the status should not blind governments to the
79. See id. at 130.
80. See id.
81. See WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 1996, supra note 77, at 187.
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reality that some circumstances necessitating the grant of protection will
continue for so long that return may not be feasible. Hence, a temporary
protection regime must plan for the eventual end-game, whether repatriation,
settlement in the country providing safe haven, or resettlement in a third
country.
Below, we outline the framework for a new temporary protection regime.
First, we detail the elements of a regional protection system. Then, we outline
a new set of temporary protection policies for the United States.
A. Regional Temporary Protection
Regional temporary protection has proven to be a new, and, in many ways,
promising instrument for handling migration emergencies. As referenced
above, the key to a regional safe haven is protection. The form and the
location can vary depending on the circumstances. A safe haven can be a
camp outside the country of origin, a safe area inside the country, or some
form of protected status in a third country.
1. Goals of the Regional Temporary Protection Policy
Regional temporary protection serves a dual goal for the United States:
protecting individuals who are or fear that they will be endangered in their
home country while deterring entrance into the United States. A regional safe
haven simultaneously permits the United States to balance its obligations
under domestic and international law with the responsibility of protecting its
borders. From the international point of view, a regional temporary protec-
tion regime facilitates the sharing of responsibility for mass migration
emergencies. A number of Latin American and Caribbean nations, in addition
to the United States, have provided temporary protection to persons fleeing
civil wars, political repression, and human rights abuses.82 Mexico, the
Bahamas, Costa Rica, and other countries in the region have simultaneously
been the destination or transit point for unauthorized migrants. A regional
protection regime would spell out the rights of and responsibilities toward
migrants within a humanitarian framework that recognizes the need for
immigration controls.
2. Who Should be Protected?
The regional temporary protection regime would seek to protect those
fleeing civil upheaval and repressive governments, not just those who qualify
under the strict definition of a refugee. Many of the Haitians and Cubans
given safe haven in Guantanamo and elsewhere would not meet the 1951
Refugee Convention definition since they would probably be unable to
82. See, e.g., THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 15, at 117-20 (discussing the ways in
which the Central American countries, Mexico, and Belize responded to refugee flows from El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Nicaragua).
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demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution. One of the justifications for
providing temporary protection rather than access to refugee processing was
the unacceptable human rights situation in Haiti with its high level of
generalized violence that mitigated against anyone's return.
The shift in defining who is eligible for protection-from purely refugee to
safe haven criteria-reflects changes in international norms. Most of the
people in need of assistance and protection internationally do not fit neatly
into the 1951 Convention definition of refugee as fleeing because of a
well-founded fear of persecution. Rather most are leaving unsettled condi-
tions in their country of origin and are eager to repatriate as soon as
conditions permit.
Forty-two African governments and ten Latin American governments have
signed regional agreements which expand the refugee definition. In 1969, the
Organization of African Unity ("OAU") developed a Convention which
expanded the UN definition to include individuals displaced by general
conditions of violence, complex or natural disasters, external aggression,
foreign domination, or events that seriously disturb the public order.
8 3
The Cartagena Declaration, adopted by ten Latin American countries in
1984, expands the refugee definition to include those who flee their country
because their "lives, safety, or freedom have been threatened by generalized
violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human
rights, or other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order.",
84
The General Assembly of the Organization of American States ("OAS")
approved this definition in 1985.85 Both the OAU and Cartagena declarations
contain a commitment to the voluntary and individual character of repatria-
tion under conditions of absolute safety.
In addition, there are persons outside Africa or Latin America considered
by UNHCR to be of international concern and who receive international
protection and assistance from the international community through UNHCR
and individual states. UNHCR is often asked to use its "good offices" in
providing assistance and protection to displaced persons, including internally
displaced persons, who may or may not meet the strict refugee definition.
86
The capacity to provide regional safe haven would be enhanced if there
were a regional agreement, with the United States as a signatory, that would
spell out who should receive such protection. The Cartagena Declaration
with its expanded refugee definition is one possible model. By providing safe
haven to Haitians and Cubans, many of whom would not be recognized as
83. See OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept. 10,
1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45.
84. See JAms C. HATHAWAY, T-t LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 19-20 (1991) (quoting Annual Report of
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1984-85, OEA/Ser.LI.66, doc. 10, rev. 1, at 190-93).
85. See id. (citing UNHCR, OAS General Assembly: An Inter-American Initiative on Refugees, 27
REFUGEES 5 (1986)).
86. See UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES 1997-98: A Hum tTARiAN AGENDA 2 (1997)
[hereinafter THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES 1997-1998].
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refugees by UNHCR, the United States has accepted, at least de facto, the
Cartagena definition, especially in regard to Haitians. The United States
already recognizes this concept in domestic law by establishing temporary
protected status for individuals who cannot be returned to their home
countries because of unstable conditions.
3. Responsibility-sharing
Another aspect of regional safe haven is responsibility-sharing during a
mass migration. Under such responsibility-sharing, the United States would
receive assistance from other Western Hemisphere countries when migrants
are heading toward the United States and would assist these other countries
should the situation be reversed. 87 Such responsibility-sharing is viable only
if the United States assumes significant leadership and shares part of the
burden, both in terms of monetary contributions and program initiatives. In
addition, because of its international leadership role, the United States must
be aware of its responsibilities in setting a precedent for other nations. The
United States cannot, for example, criticize nations for returning asylum
seekers without itself practicing and protecting the right of first asylum.
The principle of responsibility-sharing is already well established, but the
mechanisms to trigger cooperation are less well developed. One of the main
reasons that the United States was able to attract participation of other
countries in receiving Haitians and Cubans was the direct interest and
involvement at the highest levels of the White House. The negotiating was
done on an ad hoc basis after the decision had already been made to change
the United States policy of direct return. While some countries were willing
to share the burden of mass migration (albeit in relatively small numbers) out
of simple good will and a desire for strong relations with the United States,
other countries did request development assistance and other aid.
Now is the time to expand on the existing bilateral Memoranda of
Understanding ("MOUs") and also begin multilateral regional discussions
on safe haven issues. Such agreements in principle could facilitate the
decision making and implementation of a plan, as well as prevent last minute
scrambling by the Executive Branch. The Inter-governmental Consultations
on Asylum, Refugee, and Migration Policies have often been mentioned as
an example of successful ongoing multilateral discussions and could be a
model for regional cooperation on migration issues. The Puebla Process,
through which the United States, Canada, Mexico and the Central American
countries discuss common immigration interests, could also be expanded to
include discussion of regional safe haven mechanisms.
87. As the Open Society Institute explains, a goal of the regional protection system is "to regulate the
burdens experienced by particular countries." The system "may be considered a kind of insurance policy
for governments that must cope with refugee and migration emergencies." A PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A
TEMPORARY REFUGE SCHEME, supra note 2, at 6.
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Perhaps the most fitting forum for these discussions is the Organization of
American States. While this regional organization seems to have had no
involvement in the 1994 bilateral discussions or with the safe haven, the OAS
has been active in the arena of democracy and human rights. Moreover, as
noted above, the OAS General Assembly endorsed the expanded Cartagena
definition of refugee in 1985. In the fall of 1997, the OAS co-hosted a
meeting on regional protection, signaling a potential interest in the issue. 88
Strengthening the OAS and engaging its political officials in such discussions
would be worthwhile.
The role of international and regional organizations must be carefully
discussed in developing a regional temporary protection regime for responsi-
bility-sharing. In the 1994 Haitian crisis, UNHCR played a key role in
negotiations with foreign countries and monitoring of shipboard screening
and the safe havens. The presence of this international organization lent
humanitarian credence to the United States plan. The involvement of the
International Organization for Migration ("IOM") as well as the roles of
non-governmental organizations should be explored.
4. Operational Issues
Identifying sites to house those granted temporary protection is the key
operational issue to be resolved in negotiating a regional agreement. Various
sites may be needed depending on the size of the movements, their proximity
to the source country, and geopolitical sensitivities regarding a particular
emergency. To the extent possible, the migrants would be released into local
communities and be provided employment opportunities while awaiting
return to their home countries. When the size of the protected group, their
impact on the local population, or other factors make release impossible,
camps may be a necessary alternative. The negotiations on establishing the
regional protection system should address minimum requirements in terms of
overall conditions, access to medical and other services, presence of nongov-
ernmental organizations, specific policies related to unaccompanied minors
and women at risk, and other similar issues.
The negotiations should also set criteria for use of safe haven sites within
the country of origin. These should be used only as a last resort when all else
has proven ineffective in responding to the humanitarian emergency. The
risks to life for both protected and protectors have so often outweighed the
potential benefits of such in-country protection that only in the most extraor-
dinary circumstances can they be justified.
There is little disagreement that the United States military is best able to
establish safe haven camps during an emergency, whether they are located on
88. See General Secretariat of the OAS, Open Society Institute, Inter-American Institute of Human
Rights, and UNHCR, Conference on Regional Responses to Forced Migrations in Central America and
the Caribbean, Sept. 30-Oct. 1, 1997.
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a military base, such as Guantanamo, or inside another country, such as the
safe area in northern Iraq. In addition, there is little disagreement, even
within the military, that management of the camps should be turned over to
civilians as quickly as possible. There is also little disagreement that a
military base is far from an ideal site for temporary protection. Guantanamo
was not the first choice for a safe haven site, but despite high-level
Administration efforts, no site as large as Guantanamo was found that could
provide a safe haven for the Haitians and Cubans. Although other countries
offered sites, these could not accommodate enough migrants or were not
available for a sufficient period of time.
The use of a military base can cause tensions between the military, who
has military as well as humanitarian missions to fulfill, and civilian agencies,
who are not concerned with security except as it affects the migrants. While
most respondents interviewed in this study spoke to the need for handing-off
responsibility from the military to civilian agencies, it did not occur on
Guantanamo. There was no consensus on whether a civilian government
agency should manage the safe haven camps after hand-off from the military
or whether this function should be contracted to a nongovernmental organiza-
tion. Refugee camps throughout the world are run in a variety of ways,
depending on the location. In camps under UNHCR auspices, the day-to-day
management of the camp is often contracted to nongovernmental organiza-
tions ("NGOs"), with external security usually provided by the local
military.8
9
In Guantanamo, certain services within the camp were performed by the
Community Relations Service ("CRS"), a Justice Department agency. Volun-
tary agencies' presence on Guantanamo has been limited. While NGOs such
as World Relief and the International Rescue Committee worked at the
Guantanamo and Panama safe haven camps during the height of the crisis,
difficulties remain in terms of responsibilities; ability to function effectively
with limited space, supplies, and staff; relations with the military; and access
by other NGOs that also wanted to be involved.
Quality of life issues-housing, administration of justice, food, medical
care, education, recreation-must also be considered in defining responsibil-
ity for camp management. Military personnel on Guantanamo were con-
cerned with the absence of a civilian justice system in the camps. Other
important issues are access and communication. As a military base, Guan-
tanamo had few procedures for allowing outside human rights and refugee
organizations, as well as family members, to visit the camps. Nor were there
outlets for communication with a large civilian population that spoke little or
no English. Since camps thrive on rumors and misinformation, there are
advantages to permitting as much hard news as possible to make its way into
the camps (through newspapers, radio, mail, etc.) and ensuring that misinfor-
89. See UNHCR, HANDBOOK FOR EMERGENCIES: PART ONE: FIELD OPERATIONS 2-3 (Dec. 1982).
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mation is corrected as quickly as possible. Reliable information about
conditions in the country of origin is also necessary to enable those granted
temporary protection to make informed assessments about returning home.
Further operational issues pertain to the participation of the protected
population in decisions about and implementation of programs. For example,
migrants can operate schools and small businesses, assist in food preparation,
administer community and supply centers, and be involved in the administra-
tion of the camps through their elected leaders. Education and training
programs can pave the way for productive return and reintegration. However,
they can also raise expectations that cannot be readily fulfilled. In 1994,
many Haitians volunteered for police training with the expectation that jobs
would be available upon return to Haiti. The news that these jobs were not
readily available caused widespread dissatisfaction.
5. Durable Solutions
While the hope always exists that safe havens will be temporary, they are
often around much longer than anticipated. The need for protection often
continues to exist years after the initial establishment of a safe haven because
of unchanged conditions in the country of origin. Migrants often find
themselves unable to return home on a specific timetable and within the
humanitarian attention span of the international community.
What are the alternatives for those unable to return after a significant
period of time? One option is to maintain them in a safe haven indefinitely,
not a particularly attractive solution, although one encountered in many
refugee situations internationally. An option more in keeping with the
humanitarian nature of this proposal is coordinated action to find durable
solutions aside from repatriation. Local integration and third country resettle-
ment should be considered for individuals whose continued presence in
protection sites cannot be sustained.
Under some circumstances, a regional framework for protection can serve
as an impetus for safe return. Certainly, the decision to provide safe haven to
Haitian boat people bolstered the United States and regional resolve to
restore President Aristide to Haiti. The military intervention then provided
the security necessary for return.
Even without such intervention, regional and international cooperation on
the return of refugees and displaced persons can help create favorable
conditions for repatriation. For example, under the Comprehensive Plan of
Action, Vietnamese in first asylum countries in Asia, especially in Hong
Kong, were required to return to Vietnam if their claims to refugee status
were rejected. 90 Through the international negotiations, Vietnam agreed to
accept the return of the "screened out" without persecution and without
90. See THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 15, at 26-27.
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prosecution for illegal departure.9 ' Vietnam also agreed to the presence of
outside human rights monitors to oversee the situation of returnees. Return-
ees were provided with monetary help, and the Vietnam government received
some international assistance to help with reintegration. In-country monitor-
ing by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and non-
governmental organizations has not revealed any patterns of persecution
against boat people who returned to Vietnam. Further, Vietnam's increased
economic ties with Western countries, including the United States, will help
to encourage greater respect for human rights.
The Concerted Plan of Action adopted by the International Conference on
Central American Refugees ("CIREFCA") is another potential model for
coordinated regional action.92 The CIREFCA plan is particularly relevant
because it involved many countries in the Americas and succeeded in
managing the return of Salvadorans, Nicaraguans, and Guatemalans from
camps in the region.93 While the Central American peace process began prior
to the conference, CIREFCA helped institutionalize the political and eco-
nomic developments in the region that supported an end to the civil conflicts.
Some of the economic development programs adopted by CIREFCA could
also be adapted to conditions in other countries recovering from the circum-
stances that provoke the need for temporary protection. For example, Quick
Impact Projects ("QIP") provided resources to communities where there was
substantial displacement resulting from warfare. QIPs supported rehabilita-
tion of local roads, water systems, community health centers, schools,
housing, and other forms of infrastructure affected by warfare. QIPs em-
ployed both the resident population and the returnees, thereby making the
local population more receptive to the return of its residents while providing
needed transitional income for both groups.94
6. Financing Plan
The temporary protection system will entail numerous costs, including
maintenance of the protection sites in between crises and their utilization and
operation if and when an emergency occurs. For example, if the United States
were to use Guantanamo, the military would face costs greater than normally
required to maintain the base. However, certain costs would be incurred
regardless of the presence of aliens seeking protection. Reimbursement
formulas need to be developed that take into account the marginal additional
costs incurred. As part of their advance planning, the countries involved
91. Vietnam's non-prosecutorial agreement did not extend to crimes, such as murder, committed in
Vietnam prior to departure.
92. See Declaration and Concerted Plan of Action in Favor of Central American Refugees, Returnees
and Displaced Persons, Report by the Secretary-General, Office of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees: International Conference on Central American Refugees, 44th Sess., Agenda Item
110(b), at 3, U.N. Doc. A/44/527 (1989).
93. See THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 15, at 120.
94. See id. at 115.
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would have to project what the total costs could be and clarify who would
pay which costs and from which budget items.
B. Protection in the United States
A regional temporary protection regime does not obviate the need for the
United States to have credible temporary protection policies of its own. If the
United States is to take leadership in negotiating a regional agreement, our
own policies should set an example for others. Even when the regional
regime is established and triggered, some migrants are likely to reach United
States shores. Their treatment in the United States should be in accordance
with the principles of protection discussed above. Moreover, the United
States will continue to receive individual applicants who do not meet the
criteria for asylum but have a well-founded fear for their lives if returned
prematurely to their home countries.
As discussed in the first part of this article, the domestic temporary
protection system and, more specifically, TPS has been criticized from two
directions, as lacking in both humanitarian and immigration control ele-
ments. From the humanitarian point of view, the general TPS authority has
been used only for countries with small numbers of nationals in the United
States and at such a distance that fewer still would be likely to come to the
United States. With only one exception to date, TPS has provided protection
only to those who were fortunate enough to escape a civil conflict or natural
disaster before the TPS designation date, even though later arrivals were
fleeing the very same, or sometimes worse, conditions. 95
On the control side are significant problems in enforcing the departure of
individuals granted TPS. In addition, the repeated reinvocations of TPS (or
other similar statuses, such as DED or EVD) even after the conditions in a
home country have changed raise serious questions about its credibility as a
temporary program.
Finally, the Executive Branch's use of other temporary statuses to provide
protection remains troubling. IMMACT states that TPS should be the
exclusive remedy to permit aliens who are or may be otherwise deportable or
have been paroled into the United States to remain in the United States
temporarily because of their particular nationality.96 Nevertheless, as dis-
cussed above, a number of other statuses have been granted to individuals
under these circumstances. While such statuses provide flexibility to the
Executive Branch, the protection system lacks credibility when a compli-
cated range of statuses is used as political winds direct.
95. See Table 1, supra.
96. Section 302(c) of IMMACT did qualify "exclusive" authority in order to exempt Executive Order
12711 of April 11, 1990, which directed the Attorney General to defer until January 1, 1994, the enforced
departure of certain nationals of the People's Republic of China.
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A meaningful proposal to reform our temporary protection policies should
answer the following questions:
1) What policies would allow the United States to provide temporary
protection to those in genuine need without the program:
(a) attracting large numbers of those who do not deserve such
protection,
(b) adversely affecting local communities, and
(c) becoming a back route to permanent residence?
2) Given these significant constraints, who can the United States
protect and what rights and privileges can they be granted?
3) If the conditions that caused flight improve to the point that
repatriation is possible, what return policies would be appropriate for
this kind of humanitarian program?
4) If return is not possible, should integration policies, such as adjust-
ment of status, be put into place, and if so, when?
In our view, a case-by-case determination process that screens applicants
for both asylum and temporary protection best serves the humanitarian and
immigration control interests. Although there remains a role for group
designations, particularly at the start of an emergency when the personnel
may not be in place for individual screening of claims, a case-by-case
procedure more effectively addresses the weaknesses in current temporary
protection policies.
1. Eligibility Determination
In the past, protection seekers have arrived in two very different ways.
Individuals of some nationalities trickled into the United States, a small
group arriving each day until large numbers were present. This type of
movement was the most common for Central Americans, with the exception
of the large influx occurring in 1985 as a result of a change in United States
policy that deferred deportation of Nicaraguans. Others have arrived in large
numbers during a relatively short period. The entry of Cubans in the Mariel
boatlift in 1980 and Haitians and Cubans in the 1990s reflect this type of
movement.
When people fleeing civil conflict arrive in the United States either as
individuals, but even more en masse, policymakers immediately face issues
of control. Policymakers first need to decide what process should be used to
determine eligibility for protection. How can such a process fairly and
efficiently discern those who truly require temporary protection from those
whose only reason for applying is to gain entry into the United States labor
market?
Current law entitles aliens to request permission to remain in the United
States affirmatively through the INS asylum system or to present their request
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during a removal hearing before an Immigration Judge.97 Pursuant to the
expedited removal provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act of 1996 that became effective on April 1, 1997,
aliens who present themselves at ports of entry without valid documents or
with faulty documentation are no longer entitled to such a hearing. 98 The new
summary process provides the inspections officer with the final authority to
remove such aliens, with the exception of asylum seekers who establish a
"credible" fear of persecution in an interview by an Asylum Officer. Those
who establish a "credible" fear of persecution in the interview are often held
in detention pending an asylum hearing before an Asylum Officer. Asylum
Officers order those who do not establish a "credible" fear in the interview
removed, subject to the exclusive review by an Immigration Judge within
seven days of the removal order. The law does not permit judicial review on
the merits of the asylum claim. Under the new law, the Attorney General
must provide information concerning the asylum interview to aliens who
may be eligible, and an eligible alien may consult with persons of his or her
choosing before the interview. Such consultation, however, "shall be at no
expense to the government and shall not delay the process." 99
Under the new legislation, there is no exception for individuals who would
face forms of danger other than persecution. Judging from prior experience,
however, it is not clear if expedited removal will and, even more importantly,
should work in quickly deporting individuals who flee civil conflicts and
other violence. Among those determined to have a credible fear of persecu-
tion will be individuals who do not ultimately qualify as refugees, but who
may fit the TPS-type of criteria. Expedited removal delays, but does not
solve, the question of what to do with these individuals. Others subject to
immediate removal will be screened out on the credible fear standard but will
fit the TPS profile. Public opinion may not accept large-scale deportations of
individuals into such situations. Further, the countries of origin may not have
the will or the capacity to receive back those who flee in the midst of conflict.
What alternatives are available when immediate return is inhumane or
infeasible? Governments generally rely on a group designation, which has
the advantage of being relatively easy to administer. However, as evidenced
by the minimal number of designations under the current TPS law (in
comparison with the unfortunately significant number of crises in various
parts of the world) and the difficulty in terminating DED in the Salvadoran
97. See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 208, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (as added by Refugee Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(b), 94 Stat. 102, 103, Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 604(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-690.
98. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.L.No. 104-208,
§ 302, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-579. The new law allows the Attorney General to apply this as well to
individuals apprehended in the interior who originally entered without inspection. The Attorney General
has not done so to this point.
99. See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 208, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)(as added by Refugee Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(b), 94 Stat. 102, 103, Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 604(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-690).
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case, foreign policy and politics play an important role when an entire
nationality is determined to be eligible for temporary protection. The asylum
system has made considerable strides in respecting the nonpolitical nature of
the intemational refugee concept and making determinations based on individual
persecution. Our temporary protection system cannot be meaningful and credible if
its eligibility criteria are not applied in a similar principled manner.
One reason that the group designation is rarely used for nationals fleeing
from nearby countries, however, is the magnet concern. A group designation
may draw out people who are not, in fact, in danger in their home countries.
Even countries with civil wars have safe zones in which citizens live in
safety. Experience teaches that people will take great risks, including the
dangers of small boat voyages, if there is any possibility for permanent
residence in an economically more advantaged country. To the extent that
temporary protection is seen as an avenue towards such permanent residence,
there remains a serious reason to be concerned about the magnet effects of
this designation.
In order to address concerns that group designation with no cut-off date
could act as a magnet with respect to those who do not deserve protection and
that group designation with a cut-off date fails to protect similarly circum-
stanced individuals, we propose that TPS be granted on a case-by-case
basis., 00 Under this proposal, an alien could apply for asylum and temporary
protected status at the same time. If the individual failed to meet the refugee
standard, but met the TPS standard (i.e., the individual's country of origin
was in the midst of civil war or other circumstances that would make return
dangerous), he or she would be granted TPS for a specified time. This process
could be implemented within the regional protection system, if appropriate,
or on a unilateral basis. If implemented as part of the regional system, those
granted TPS may be permitted to remain in the United States or sent to a
regional site, depending on numbers, likelihood of magnet effects if permit-
ted to remain in the United States, and other similar factors.' 0'
This proposal provides greater flexibility in determining the appropriate
status for an individual. It permits protection of those who truly fear return
not only because of persecution, but also because of civil wars and other
extreme violence. It does not require the Executive Branch to designate all
members or even a subpart of a particular national group for TPS. Instead,
case-by-case determinations would be made against agreed-upon criteria.
For example, individuals from certain geographic areas might be safely
returned to a country with a civil war while others would face grave danger.
100. Group designations could still be used where decisions can be made expeditiously in order to
protect those already in the country when an emergency occurs.
101. The United States Commission on Immigration Reform recommended an expedited proceeding
during mass migration emergencies in the United States. Applicants meeting a credible fear of persecution
standard would be admitted into the United States, under the Commission's proposal; those meeting a TPS
standard would be protected elsewhere in the region; and those meeting neither standard would be
repatriated. U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 2, at 20-23.
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Thus, the temporary protection seeker would be required to establish two
primary elements: (1) a civil war, natural disaster, or comparable form of
upheaval has occurred in the home country and its effects are ongoing; and
(2) requiring the return of this individual to that country would pose a serious
threat to his or her personal safety. If the determination system were
implemented well, a case-by-case system could separate those in genuine
need of protection from those who could be immediately returned.
The timing of such a process must balance the importance of providing
protection seekers a fair opportunity with the significance of quickly sending
a message to those who do not deserve protection that only the bonafide need
apply. The evidence to date of the streamlined affirmative asylum process
suggests that such balances can be made in setting up the process.10 2 A
system that allows the non-governmental community to play a significant
role-as the Joint Voluntary Agencies do in the resettlement process, the
Qualified Designated Entities ("QDE") did in the legalization process, and
NGOs do in legal representation and education projects-could help balance
the fairness and efficiency demands.
An individualized determination system also would reduce the political
and foreign policy pressures on determining what nationalities would be
eligible and how long temporary protection is needed. It could be both
generous and credible. The latter in terms of applying consistent criteria
outside of the political context as well as by ferreting out those who are not in
genuine need of protection.
As with the regional protection system, a number of operational issues
arise, as discussed below.
2. Decisionmakers
The officers most capable of making TPS determinations are those
familiar, or able to become familiar, with conditions abroad-Asylum
Officers. Asylum Officers are charged with understanding conditions abroad,
and some now go overseas to make refugee determinations for the resettle-
ment program. They lend credibility to a humanitarian program at the same
time that such expert adjudicators expedite the process. Of course, it is likely
that such use of Asylum Officers would require shifting expert resources
away from the normal asylum workload. Other trained personnel who could
be called on to supplement Asylum Officers for making TPS determinations
include former Asylum Officers and Immigration Judges.
3. Costs
Such a system comes with administrative costs. But those costs may not be
substantially higher than the current system in which many of those who
102. See U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 2, at 29; U.S. COMMISSION ON
IMMIGRATION REFORM, REFUGEE AND HUMANITARIAN ADMISSIONS: APPENDIX 270-79 (1997).
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require temporary protection apply for asylum either during or after the grant
of TPS or DED. With respect to extensions, it may not be necessary to
readjudicate individual claims. Instead, the analysis and decision making as
to whether conditions permit a lifting of temporary protection could be put
into the hands of a workgroup of experts.
4. Detention/Release
Given the degree of illegal migration into the United States, fairly quick
reception into the community may act as a magnet for those who are not
fleeing dangerous conditions but simply are seeking a better economic life.
From an immigration control point of view, it may be necessary to detain
those who receive temporary protection for the duration of protection, that is,
until conditions in the home country permit return. Such controls would be
needed to lessen any magnet effect by helping to ensure that those who do not
deserve protection do not come. Support for this line of reasoning comes from the
rapid reduction in boat departures from Haiti and Cuba when the United States
offered protection in Guantanamo but no entry into the United States.10 3 Initial
detention would also help ensure that disruptions of local communities are
minimized when large numbers of migrants enter in a short period.
Currently, there is insufficient capacity to hold significant numbers of
people seeking temporary protection in the United States, even if the
detention were limited to the initial determination phase. Possible holding
facilities include closed military bases, where barracks still stand or other
forms of shelter could be raised quickly. If the flow of .those seeking
temporary protection is concentrated in significant numbers, immediate
response teams may need to include the military in order to establish the
infrastructure for holding centers.
From the humanitarian point of view, detention unfairly punishes those
who genuinely need protection. Other forms of control over the protected
population can be devised. In several European countries, open camps are
used that do not restrict the movement of those provided protection, but
restrict their access to work and other benefits. In Denmark, for example,
those protected were initially allowed to stay in special centers administered
by the Danish Red Cross. Ultimately, private accommodations were allowed,
as long as the cost did not exceed that of the Red Cross center. 104
A middle ground would be a system of reporting to a third party so that the
whereabouts of those provided temporary protection is always known. In the
early 1980s, certain Haitian migrants who were initially detained were
ultimately released into the community under an arrangement whereby they
103. See DAILY INTERDICTIONS OF HAITIAN BOAT PEOPLE, supra note 52, and DAILY INTERDICTIONS OF
CUBAN MIGRANTS, supra note 63.
104. See SECRETARIAT OF THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL CONSULTATIONS ON ASYLUM, REFUGEE, AND
MIGRATION POLICIES IN EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA, AND AUSTRALIA, REPORT ON TEMPORARY PROTECTION IN
STATES IN EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA, AND AUSTRALIA 83 (1995).
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regularly reported to voluntary agencies that forwarded such information
through Fordham University to the INS. Reportedly, the compliance rate was
very high. The Vera Institute, under contract with the INS, currently is
studying various tracking mechanisms based on an alien's close community
ties in order to increase appearance rates at immigration proceedings while
providing alternatives to detention.' 0 5 Their pilot program, it is hoped, will
develop creative solutions to address the government's interests in prevent-
ing absconding while using detention only for those who pose dangers to the
community. The results of the Vera Institute pilot may also provide some
guidance with respect to such populations as the temporarily protected.
What is clear is that a single detention/release policy is unlikely to fit for
all temporary protection situations. The federal government should have the
flexibility to base release decisions on specific criteria-the number of
applications, their geographic concentration, and the likely duration of the
crisis causing the flight, among others. In the final analysis, protection must
be the guiding determinant. Although seldom desirable, detention will be
preferable to return to life-threatening situations.
5. Work Authorization/Eligibility for Public Benefits
Another major issue regarding the rights of those temporarily protected in
the United States concerns authorization to work and eligibility for public
benefits. 106
Work authorization has been favored over public financing in the United
States, and recent laws have sought to grant work authorizations in a manner
that does not create a magnet for those who do not deserve an immigration
benefit. 10 7 Now, the asylum system generally authorizes work only for those
granted asylum, a process that takes several months, whereas in the past, that
benefit attached to the asylum seeker during the application process. If
policymakers continue to favor employment authorization over public fund-
ing, they will need to determine when work would be permitted based on a
number of questions:
1) How soon might the conflict in the home country end and repatria-
tion be safe?
2) Should work authorization be delayed for some period (six months,
105. See VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE APPEARANCE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, INS CoNTRACT #
COW-6-C-0038.
106. This may be dependent on the resolution of the detention issue, but not necessarily.
107. In 1995, the regulatory asylum reforms decoupled work authorization from the asylum applica-
tion, such that asylum applicants receive work permits only after asylum is granted or five months pass
after the application is filed without a decision, whichever occurs first. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a) (1996). In 1996,
section 640(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act barred the INS from
granting work authorization until six months pass without a decision or asylum is granted, whichever
occurs first. See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, ( 208, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (as added by Refugee
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, ( 201(b), 94 Stat. 102, 103, Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, (604(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-690).
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for example) to discourage individuals not deserving of protection from
taking advantage of a humanitarian program?
3) How many workers within a specified period of time can enter the
local workforce without causing serious adverse consequences to the
already-resident workers?
The impact of new workers depends on a range of factors, including the
state of local economies, the availability of similarly-skilled workers, and the
duration of temporary protection. Such workers may cause an adverse impact
on already-resident workers in the local economies, or they might make a
positive contribution to the state of the local economy. While a labor market
analysis of the impact of any new population on a community may be
difficult to make with any certainty, the issue needs to be considered. First,
though positive and negative effects of new labor may be a challenge to
measure in a quantitative way, some directions may be observable. Second,
choices as to where a new population is initially settled can take into account
what is known about current local labor markets.
Under one option, service providers could be involved in an effort to place
those with temporary protection in local areas where work is available. Based
on their work in connection with the refugee resettlement program, such
organizations may be able to provide an informal assessment of labor market
conditions in determining where to place those granted temporary protection.
The data that the Department of State requires from service providers with
respect to job placements may prove useful in understanding local job
markets. A similar approach had some success with Vietnamese and Cambo-
dian refugees and Cuban boat people. While many of each group relocated to
areas where large numbers of their nationality lived, a significant proportion
remained in the more favorable economic environment.
With respect to benefit eligibility, recipients of TPS were eligible for a
limited range of benefits even before the 1996 welfare reforms, including:
emergency health care; food and other help for women, infants, and children;
school lunch and breakfast programs; public education; unemployment
insurance; and job training if eligible under the state's job training and
partnership program. '0 8 They have not been eligible for Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (or its successor, TANF), Supplemental Security In-
come, food stamps, or Medicaid. Under the new welfare law, these restric-
tions continue and additional ones are added (no job training or federal share
of unemployment insurance, for example) because TPS beneficiaries would
be treated as "nonqualified aliens" for purposes of public benefits.' 0 9
108. See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 244(f), 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (as amended by
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101--649, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5030, Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 308(b)(7), 110 Stat. 3009-546,
3009-615).
109. See JOYCE C. VIALET & LARRY M. ENG, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ALIEN ELIGIBILITY
FOR BENEFITS UNDER P. L. 104-193, THE NEW WELFARE LAW 2-3 (Aug. 30, 1996).
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As with other nonqualified aliens, the federal government must consider
what aid might be appropriate to mitigate the fiscal burden on local commu-
nities in providing the services for which they retain eligibility. The size of
the school-age population, for example, would be known, so that education
costs could be calculated with some accuracy. Depending on what kind of
healthcare would be authorized by the federal government, local facilities
could be reimbursed for covered costs. This would require a workable
method for accurately establishing actual costs.
Although the new welfare reform legislation would appear to settle the
issue of benefits eligibility, it well may come back in the event of a mass
influx of individuals seeking temporary protection. If sizable numbers arrive
in crisis circumstances, they are likely to require some transitional assistance
before they obtain employment. When such movements have occurred in the
past, special legislation was enacted to provide benefits similar to those
available to refugees. Under the welfare reform legislation, as amended,
refugees and Cuban-Haitian entrants retain eligibility for assistance during
the first seven years after their entry. Unlike refugees, the temporarily
protected would not need other types of integration services (since they are
not expected to remain in the United States), but they may require short-term
cash and medical assistance.
6. The End Game
The upheavals that cause people to flee their homelands are varied and
often complex. Conditions must improve to the point that people can safely
return home before temporary protection is no longer needed. What happens
when temporary protection ends is key to the credibility of protection
policies in the United States. Until we are able to be firm when firmness is
possible, we will not be able to be generous in providing protection inside
this country.
If conditions improve within a reasonable period of time, most people will
be able to return home. If conditions do not improve within such a period,
questions will arise as to the continued viability of a temporary protection
regime. This section discusses various end game issues, including repatria-
tion, access to the asylum system when temporary protection is ended,
cancellation of removal, and administrative/legislative adjustment of status
to permanent residence.
i. Return
Return of those granted temporary protection could be accomplished in a
number of ways. Removal under our existing immigration laws could be
used. Once temporary protection status is ended, those who remain in the
country would be here illegally. Notices to appear would be issued against
such over-stayers, initiating the removal process. If deportation is carried out,
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it removes the concern some have of providing protection at all. On the other
hand, carrying out deportations in large numbers may create destabilizing
conditions in the home country. Moreover, deportation is a costly process,
requiring INS officers and Immigration Judges to handle large numbers of
cases. Some believe that it is simply wrong to return forcibly those who have
fled civil wars and other emergencies that significantly damage a country,
noting that the humanitarian impulse that justified temporary protection
needs to be matched by a humanitarian return approach.
A more fitting end game is to plan for return as a part of the larger political
and economic reconstruction processes in the home country. Return of those
granted temporary protection could be accomplished by voluntary means
with a combination of individual financial and home country development
aid incentives. For UNHCR, the standard criteria for return are "voluntary
repatriation in safety and dignity," preferably in an organized fashion and
with the cooperation of the governments of both the host country and the
country of origin." 0 Organized plans commonly include assurances of safe
passage, material assistance to help those returning to reestablish themselves,
and provisions for an international presence of some kind to monitor their
safety.II
Under an option emphasizing humanitarian return, people would be
assisted in returning voluntarily. Such assistance could include direct finan-
cial assistance targeted to communities to which people return, similar to the
QIPs described above. The International Organization for Migration runs a
number of programs assisting individual returnees going from developed
back to developing countries. Under some of these programs, IOM helps
returnees find employment in their home countries and pays the differential
in salary for a limited time.1 12 Several Western European countries have
negotiated return agreements with Eastern European nations that provide
assistance for the reintegration of returnees.
Funding any return policy is critical. Financial assistance from taxpayers
requires sufficient public support for the policy. Another option would be to
set aside Social Security payments made by those temporarily protected in a
special fund to be distributed only upon return. The employee Social Security
contributions would go directly to the individual, while the employer
contributions could be targeted to the communities to which nationals are
returning.
Providing financial incentives and aid to returnees and local communities
may encourage the return of a good number of people. However, it is difficult
to assist the home country communities enough to ensure that returnees will
not be simply added to high unemployment rates and subject to rising crime
110. See THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES 1997-98, supra note 86, at 147.
111. See id. at 164-81.
112. See, INT'L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, Policies and Practices with Respect to Rejected Asylum Seekers,
1992, MC/INF/222, at 17-18, and Annex 11, 1-2.
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rates where a civil war or other emergency has just ended. If people believe
that conditions at home will not allow them to provide food, shelter, and
clothing for their families, they will opt to stay illegally in the United States.
Our reform proposal, therefdre, combines voluntary and mandatory ele-
ments. Return of those granted temporary protection could be accomplished
first through voluntary means with assistance; but, if that does not work,
removal under existing immigration laws would proceed. Under this pro-
posal, people would be given a period of time to avail themselves of
repatriation benefits, such as those described above. Those who do not opt for
that form of return during the period when it is offered would be subject to
removal as well as to possible penalties regarding future immigration to the
United States.
This proposal gives people a chance to return home in safety and dignity. If
the Social Security special fund constituted the financial assistance given to
those who return, United States taxpayers would not be funding that
assistance. If the QIPs and development aid are well funded and imple-
mented, this option reduces the risk that return will create instability in the
home country. The mandatory removal process may ensure that a large
number of people return and that the United States public supports protection
in the first place. While the ideal return policy is a voluntary one, we would
prefer a firm policy at the end of the period of protection if that is the only
way to have temporary protection in the first place.
ii. Access to the Asylum System
As noted above, when temporary protection ends within a reasonable
period of time, most individuals are expected to return home. For a small
number of individuals, a question remains as to their eligibility at the end of
the temporary period to apply for asylum.
As with other TPS issues, the arguments for and against access to asylum
proceedings have some merit. Immigration control argues for limited access:
those offered temporary protection generally should be precluded from
applying for any other form of protection or relief at the end of the temporary
period. More expanded access might attract those who simply want to find a
way to stay in the United States permanently. On the other hand, humanitar-
ian interests require access to asylum proceedings, at least when there are
changed circumstances in the home country-for example, when a new
regime coming to power could give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution
for an individual on the outs with that regime. Domestic law should protect
Convention refugees from return to a country of persecution whatever their
prior status.
An advantage of the individualized determination process described above
is that it permits an asylum review and decision at the beginning of the
process rather than after temporary protection ends. Those granted temporary
protection instead of asylum already will have been determined to be
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non-refugees. Unless they could show that a specific, subsequent change in
home country conditions alters the validity of the original asylum decision,
there would be no grounds for reopening their asylum application.
iii. Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment of Status
When the United States permits certain individuals or groups to enter or
remain in the United States in emergency circumstances, that permission is
generally intended to be a temporary one. The United States expects forced
migrants to return home when circumstances improve and the emergency
ends. But emergencies do not always end before such individuals become
part of the United States community.
Under current policy, those who enter the United States when fleeing
dangerous conditions at home enjoy varying benefits regarding if, and when,
they can become permanent residents. Those who qualify for asylum already
may have suffered such persecution that it would be inhumane to return them
to their home countries even when the persecuting regime falls. Asylees
currently are able to apply for permanent residence one year after they are
granted asylum. 113
Congress required that those granted TPS generally cannot adjust status
through Congressional action unless a supermajority in the Senate supports
such a measure.' 14 At the time the TPS legislation passed, the principal
mechanism for adjustment was suspension of deportation. " 5 Available to all
migrants in the United States for more than seven years, suspension required
a showing of "extreme hardship" to the individual or his or her family if
deportation took place. n 6 The TPS statute specifically provided that if the
Attorney General determines-with respect to an alien granted temporary
protected status-that "extreme hardship" exists, then the temporary protec-
tion period can be counted as part of the seven year physical presence
requirement." 7 This policy recognized that individuals become part of their
113. See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 209,66 Stat. 163 (1952) (as amended by Refugee
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(b), 94 Stat. 102, 103, Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-649, § 104(a)(1), § 603(a)(4), 104 Stat. 4978, 5082, Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and
Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-232, § 307(1)(1), 105 Stat. 1733, 1756, Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.. L. No. 104-208, § 308(g)(3)(A),
(4)(A), § 371 (b)(2), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-622, 3009-645).
114. See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 244(h), 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (as amended by
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5030, Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 308(b)(7), 110 Stat. 3009-546,
3009-615).
115. See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 244, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (as amended by
Immigration Act of'1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5030, Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 308(b)(7), 110 Stat. 3009-546,
3009-615).
116. See id.
117. See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 244(b)(1), 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (as amended by
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5030, Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 308(b)(7), 110 Stat. 3009-546,
3009-615). This language differs from the language in the old suspension of deportation provision, which
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local communities over time and that deportation becomes increasingly more
difficult. Without a potential for adjustment, these individuals remain in
limbo.
In 1996, Congress significantly raised the requirements for this type of
adjustment such that very few, if any, are likely to qualify for this type of
relief, now called "cancellation of removal." The new cancellation of
removal provisions heightened the standard to "exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship" for all; restricted its application to United States citizen or
permanent resident children, spouses, or parents, not to the alien himself or
herself; and raised the time period of continuous residence and good moral
character to ten years.' 18
The TPS statute envisioned suspension of deportation proceedings in the
immigration courts. It is likely that many individuals protected over long
periods of time would have been able to meet the extreme hardship test and
thus could have clogged up the courts in costly and tedious hearings. For this
reason, prior to Congress' shift in policy, some observers had called for an
administrative suspension of the deportation process that could be efficiently
implemented by immigration officers, much like the current affirmative
asylum system is now.
The various weaknesses in the policies available to adjust status have often
led Congress to pass special legislation. In June 1989, the Chinese govern-
ment cracked down on dissidents during demonstrations in Tianamen
Square.I" 9 The Bush Administration suspended forced departures of Chinese
nationals and then, in 1990, provided Chinese students in the United States at
the time with DED.120 In 1992, Congress enacted the Chinese Student
Protection Act enabling most DED beneficiaries to adjust to permanent
residence.12 1 Previous administrations had granted various nationalities EVD
to allow such nationals to remain in the United States, including Ethiopians
(1977-82, then on a case-by-case basis), Ugandans (1978-86), Afghans
(1980-85, then on a case-by-case basis), and Poles (1982-89). 122 In 1987,
Congress enacted a special provision allowing EVD beneficiaries from these
four nationalities to apply for temporary resident status and eventually
required a determination that deportation would result in extreme hardship "to the alien or to his spouse,
parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence." See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1992) (repealed by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, § 308(b)(7)).
118. See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 245, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)(as amended by
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 413(d), 110 Stat. 1214,
1269, Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 308(f)(1)(O), 2(C), (g)(10)(B), § 375, §,376(a), § 671(a)(4)(A), (5), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-621,
3009-648, 3009-721).
119. See ALFJNIKOFF ET AL., supra note 9, at 888.
120. See EXEC. ORDER No. 12711, 55 Fed. Reg. 13897 (1990).
121. See Chinese Student Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-404, 106 Stat. 1969 (1992).
122. See FRELICK & KOHNEN, supra note 19, at 28.
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permanent resident status. 1 2 3 This adjustment legislation occurred in the
context of the 1986 legalization program and addressed certain inequities in
that program. Most recently, Congress legislated a range of benefits in 1997
to resolve the status of Central Americans and Eastern Europeans: from
immediate adjustment for Nicaraguans to the old suspension of deportation
standards and process for Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Eastern Europe-
ans. 124 Conspicuously absent from any form of relief were Haitians. Presi-
dent Clinton has endorsed legislation that would provide leniency for
Haitians, and in December 1997 extended DED on their behalf pending the
outcome of that legislative initiative. In October 1998, Congress provided
adjustment relief to Haitians by enacting the Haitian Refugee Immigration
Fairness Act. 1
25
We propose a more consistent approach that would provide for automatic
adjustment to permanent residence, regardless of nationality, if the grant of
temporary protection continues for a very lengthy period. The potential for
return diminishes over time and the United States should recognize this fact
in its policies. Rather than require statutory authority or a lengthy judicial
process to address the inevitable problems in returning people so long after
they left their home countries, this approach enables a more streamlined
administrative process. If the federal government determines that the condi-
tions for return have not been met within the specified period (e.g., seven
years), recipients of TPS would be eligible to become legal immigrants
unless they failed to meet the usual tests regarding public charge, criminal
behavior, and related grounds of inadmissibility.
Whatever the means to permanent residence at the end of TPS, there is
some concern that such a policy would act as a magnet. In particular,
migrants may be willing to risk departure to the United States if there is only
a limited possibility of permanent residence. Since many civil wars last for
the time likely to be included in any such trigger, the migrants would have
reason to believe that TPS is indeed a route not only to enter, but also to
remain in, the United States. We believe that these concerns are best
addressed, by instituting individual TPS adjudications that ferret out those
who do not deserve protection and returning such persons right at the
beginning. Such firmness will limit any magnet effect, along with related
actions regarding initial detention and a waiting period for work authoriza-
tion.
At the end of the day, if return is not possible and these individuals have
lived in the United States and become Americanized, policymakers face a
123. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-204,
§ 902, 101 Stat. 1331 (1987).
124. See Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), Pub. L. No. 105-100,
§ 201, 111 Stat. 2160, 2193 (1997).
125. See Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 101(h), 12 Stat. 2681
(1998).
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choice between leaving them in limbo or regularizing their status. Without
legal status, such individuals are exploitable and will not be able to integrate
into American society. Such an ad hoc policy harms the interests of society as
well, contributing to the growth of an underclass that will remain politically
marginalized without the chance to become a part of the polity. Regularizing
the status of those who will remain in the United States through a consistent
policy applicable to all would overcome those problems and enable a
humanitarian program to end in a noble way.
V. CONCLUSION
There is a new imperative for considering significant reform of TPS along
the lines we have proposed. The new expedited asylum system raises many
concerns, not least of which is the potential harm that expedited review poses
for bona fide refugees whose credibility is questioned. Equally disturbing is
the absence of any exception for individuals who would face forms of danger
other than persecution. Will expedited removal result in deporting individu-
als who flee civil conflicts and other violence? Will the American public
tolerate large-scale deportations of people who fit the TPS profile, but who
are screened out on the credible fear standard and immediately removed?
Our proposal protects those who fear death or other dangers, and does so
by building on the success of the asylum reforms that occurred in recent
years. At a minimum, an asylum officer and an immigration judge should be
able to adjudicate claims both to asylum as well as TPS on an individual,
case-by-case basis before expedited removal is permitted to conditions of
civil war and other extreme violence. If fully implemented, our proposal
would establish a clear, consistent basis for temporarily protecting persons
fleeing such dangerous situations. Further, this proposal provides a frame-
work for United States involvement in the regional protection system
described above and offers an example to other countries that will be called
upon to address mass migration emergencies. The proposal is both firm and
fair, and would result both in better immigration control and a more humane
response to these crises.
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TABLE 2-COAST GUARD HAITIAN RESCUE STATISTICS
Source: Seventh Coast Guard District Public Affairs Office (305) 536-5641. Numbers include
all Haitians migrants rescued within the Seventh District as of 03 Sep 98
ByYear
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
64 158 687 2,951 2,327 3,176 3,588 4,699 3,368
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
1,131 9,941 31,401 2,329 24,917 1,969 700 587 270
By Month
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
1982 106 0 12 0 13 0 8 0 0 0 0 19
1983 0 13 0 44 29 153 90 6 33 142 60 117
1984 30 326 26 74 250 187 43 58 393 149 872 543
1985 104 20 67 682 256 24 0 294 548 44 16 272
1986 261 470 160 545 180 92 0 1,255 7 8 37 161
1987 218 27 250 31 187 165 606 602 544 369 419 170
1988 497 0 739 328 526 401 402 172 348 452 392 442
1989 340 141 1,533 417 0 136 150 70 423 121 0 37
1990 54 90 0 101 0 123 207 0 136 95 94 231
1991 246 0 0 717 70 127 198 43 163 19 6,012 2,346
1992 6,477 1,401 1,158 6,144 13,053 473 160 252 84 714 712 772
1993 1,363 9 10 3 0 96 26 23 371 148 60 220
1994 78 347 274 612 1,448 5,603 16,019 319 130 20 110 0
1995 0 0 0 240 0 41 148 428 0 10 1,102 14
1996 195 179 235 0 2 66 0 10 0 13 0 0
1997 0 1 0 0 0 0 19 147 0 0 420 0
1998 0 0 0 55 90 103 22 0 0
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TABLE 4--COAST GUARD CUBAN RESCUE STATISTICS
Source: Seventh Coast Guard District Public Affairs Office (305) 536-5641.
Numbers include all Cuban migrants rescued within the Seventh District as of
03 Sep 98
By Year
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
NA NA 47 19 43 27 44 59 391
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
467 2,203 2,557 3,656 37,139 626 393 406 712
By Month
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
1990 42 24 18 47 40 25 22 55 84 30 9 71
1991 53 13 116 272 378 390 190 204 252 175 69 .91
1992 80 53 144 153 191 93 293 485 468 263 191 143
1993 158 143 153 172 243 188 240 441 522 609 429 358
1994 248 384 474 726 716 1,173 1,010 21,300 11,085 20 3 0
1995 0 123 35 191 51 40 13 43 16 13 66 35
1996 27 21 40 1 43 17 30 50 87 40 3 42
1997 5 15 35 19 42 13 98 43 74 4 15 43
1998 57 22 48 62 93 161 131 108 30
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TEMPORARY PROTECTION: INTERVIEWS AND MEETING
WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND OTHER INTERESTED
PARTIES**
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES
T Alexander Aleinikoff, General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization
Service; Executive Associate Commissioner for Programs, Immigration
and Naturalization Service
Lt. Commander John Allen, United States Coast Guard, Guantanamo Naval
Base
GeneralAyres, Commanding General, Guantanamo Naval Base
R. Rand Beers, Director, Global Issues and Multinational Affairs, National
Security Council
Dan Cadman, District Director, Miami, Immigration and Naturalization
Service
Phyllis Coven, Deputy Associate Attorney General, Department of Justice;
Director, International Affairs, Immigration and Naturalization Service
Joel Danies, Haiti Working Group, Department of State
Richard Day, Chief Counsel, Senate Subcommittee on Immigration
Diane Dillard, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services, Department of
State
Morton Halperin, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director,
Global Issues and Multinational Affairs, National Security Council
Col. Hendricks, Guantanamo Naval Base
Douglas Hunter, Director, Office of Policy, Bureau of Population, Refugees
and Migration, Department of State
Janelle Jones, Deputy Director, Refugees Bureau, Office of International
Affairs, Immigration and Naturalization Service
David Kornbluth, Senior Migration Policy Officer, Bureau of Population,
Refugees and Migration, Department of State
Kenneth Leutbecker, Associate Director, Immigration and Refugee Affairs,
Community Relations Service, Department of Justice; Coordinator,
Humanitarian Affairs, Office of International Affairs, Immigration and
Naturalization Service
Commander Luke, United States Coast Guard, Miami
David Martin, General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service
Marie McGlone, Counsel, House Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims
Brunson McKinley, Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of
Population, Refugees and Migration, Department of State
Doris Meissner, Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service
** The titles and organizations provided are the ones that were current at the times these interviews
occurred.
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Commander Morrison, United States Coast Guard, Miami
Michael Myers, Policy Director, Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs, Depart-
ment of Defense; Counsel, Senate Subcommittee on Immigration
Phyllis Oakley, Assistant Secretary for Population, Refugees and Migration,
Department of State
Col. Michael Pearson, Guantanamo Naval Base
Gene Pugliese, Counsel, House Subcommittee on Immigration
Geri Ratliff, Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice
Grover Joseph Rees, Staff Director, House Subcommittee on International
Operations and Human Rights
Terry Rusch, Director, Office of Refugee Admissions, Bureau of Population,
Refugees and Migration, Department of State
Glenn Schmidt, Counsel, House Subcommittee on Immigration
Eric Schwartz, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director,,
Democracy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, National Security
Counsel; Director, Global Issues and Multinational Affairs, National
Security Counsel
Lt. Col. Ed Seely, Civil Affairs, Guantanamo Naval Base
David Stewart, Assistant Legal Adviser, Human Rights and Refugees,
Department of State
Cordia Strom, Counsel, Senate Immigration Subcommittee; Chief Counsel,
House Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims
Kathleen Sullivan, Counsel, Senate Subcommittee on Immigration
Lt. Col. Len Tatum, Guantanamo Naval Base
Kathleen Thompson, Director, Refugees Bureau, Office of International
Affairs, Immigration and Naturalization Service
Jeffrey Weiss, Director, Immigration and Refugee Affairs, Community Rela-
tions Service, Department of Justice
Captain Wilder, United States Coast Guard, Miami
STATE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES
Debbie Kilmer, Director, Washington Office, State of Florida
Mark Schlakman, Special Counsel to the Governor of Florida
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION REPRESENTATIVES
Kofi Asomani, Special Envoy for Haiti, United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees
Anne Willem Biljeveld, Washington Representative, United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees
Hans-Petter Boe, Chief of Mission, Washington Office, International Organi-
zation for Migration




Cy Winter, Operations Officer, International Organization for Migration,
Guantanamo Naval Base
PRIVATE ORGANIZATION REPRESENTATIVES AND RESEARCHERS
Angela Brown, World Relief, Guantanamo Refugee Project
Guarione Diaz, President, Cuban American National Council; Ombudsman
for Cubans on Guantanamo
Patricia Weiss Fagan, Consultant
Elizabeth Ferris, Executive Director, Church World Services
Joan Fitzpatrick, University of Washington Law School
John Fredriksson, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service
William Frelick, Senior Policy Analyst, United States Committee for Refu-
gees
Dennis Gallagher, Executive Director, Refugee Policy Group
Lucas Guttentag, Director, Immigrant Rights Project, American Civil Liber-
ties Union
Arthur C. Helton, Director, Forced Migration Projects, Open Society Institute
Carl Hampe, Paul Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison
Rosemary Jenks, Center for Immigration Studies
Michael Lempres, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld
Cheryl Little, Florida Rural Legal Services
Charles B. Keely, Georgetown University
Jack Martin, Director of Research, Center for Immigration Studies; Federa-
tion for American Immigration Reform
Jana Mason, United States Committee for Refugees
Jocelyn McCalla, Executive Director, National Coalition for Haitian Refu-
gees
Kathleen Newland, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace
Rosemarie Rogers, Tufts University
Rick Swartz, Swartz and Associates
John Swenson, Executive Director, Migration and Refugee Services, United
States Catholic Conference
Barry Stein, Michigan State University
Carol Wolchok, Director, Center for Immigration Law and Representation,,
American Bar Association
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